"Hearts and Minds"

The discussion in class today got me thinking about the situation in Afghanistan and the current U.S. strategy there. It's apparent that our main goal today is to set up a pro-American government which can bring stability to and excise it's authority over Afghanistan. The first part has already been accomplished - even if Karzai occasionally spouts some rhetoric bordering on anti-American, it's nothing more then rhetoric. I think it's obvious that the Afghanistan government is in no position to go against any wishes of the United States.

It is the second part that remains to be the biggest challenge. Fundamentally I think there are two ways in which a government maintains its power. Either through popular consensus, or through force. Even a government which is considered "unpopular" may still retain its power if people are content enough not to risk their lives going up against it. When they are though, the only way to maintain rule is through force. Of these two, I think the Soviet experience in  Afghanistan has proven that the latter simply doesn't work. It's somewhat amazing how strong of a will these desert dwelling people possess. The more force you apply, the more resistance you will face. Even the might of the U.S. military has not been able to stamp out resistance in the region, and that's saying a lot.

The other option, which most people would agree is by far the preferable, is to somehow instill support for the government in the Afghan people. I think this is what the U.S. strategy aims to do, but honestly I don't know how it could ever work. Afghanistan is a deeply divided society, on many different fronts. When the military speaks of "hearts and minds" I don't think they are referring to the city dwelling populations. The term modern doesn't really apply very well in Afghanistan, but places like Kabul are about as modern as you can get there, and modern people are fairly easy to please. Education, jobs and the the prospect of economic advancement is all most urban folk really want (though those goals are not always easy to achieve). That and the basics like freedom from oppression and the standard package of human rights - but this is America we're talking about. The hearts and minds of the rural folk though, are the ones I think this strategy is really calling for, and therein lies the problem.

The issues involve are so complex and I don't pretend to be able to offer any kind of thorough analysis on this, but I do think I can recognize some of the key issues and difficulties involved in the situation. When one aims to win the "heart and mind" of a Afghan, a very fundamental problem arises - there really is no such thing as an Afghan.

The lack of any sort of national identity in Afghanistan is a problem when trying to get people to accept the authority of a centralized government. To a rural Pashtun, his identity is his qawm - his village and local community, his family and the places he has grown and lived all his life, his religious leaders and tribe. And with that goes a set of values very distinct from our own. To people like this, the centralized government in Kabul is as foreign as the United States or Soviet Russia. Why should a Pashtun who is living as people have for thousands of years want to pay taxes to or submit to the authority of what he sees a western controlled government who is opposed to all the values he holds dear and which define who he is? What can the government in Kabul offer the average Afghan who is content to live his life and is unconcerned with the rest of the world and things like modernization - and is in fact threatened by it?

Further making our position weaker there is the attempt to impose western values on the Afghans. Freedom of religion, equal rights for women, and the various other changes the new government is trying to impose are all great things - but not necessarily if they are contributing to the instability of the region and prolong bloodshed. In my poorly informed opinion, I feel like the only way for winning "hearts and minds" is to simply let the rural people be as they are, and in time perhaps changes will come. Of course I'm being overly simplistic and there are much larger issues involved - like how to run a government if you don't tax the rural populations, but I can't imagine that trying to force certain changes on these people will ever work. Ultimately I think the situation is going to call for a lot of compromises. We just simply can not have our cake in Afghanistan and expect to eat it too. I think some compromise has already begun on the part of the Afghan government through the re-assimilation of militants who surrender to the government, and possible talks of negotiation with the Taliban. I wonder though how far the American military is willing to compromise, and if it will even do any good at this point...