Restrepo is a great piece of journalism. It offers a not often seen glimpse into the day to day lives of the soldiers stationed in Afghanistan, and I think it does a far better job of showing the reality of the war than the U.S. media. It doesn't attempt to directly state anything and I think offers an unbiased view, as much as is possible at least, given that it is shot only from an American perspective for obvious reasons. Still, several key themes stand out throughout the film, and it is a candid look into the experience and the views of Americans stationed over there.
The first thing that struck me is how lush and beautiful the Korangal Valley is. I suppose you get the impression of Afghanistan as this harsh, dessert wasteland, but the Korangal isn't too much different than the American southwest. Another striking feature is just how rough the terrain is. Afghanistan is infamous for being mountainous, but it's not until you see the villages dug into the sides of the hills and the sharp maze of "spurs" that you really appreciate that this is not an easy land to navigate. The beautiful landscape is soon contrasted with the ugliness of war, and the frequent skirmishes between the Americans and the Taliban become a daily part of life.
Lack of Infrastructure: This is one of the major themes in the film. Most of the time spent with the Americans takes place in a little hovel of a base called OP Restrepo. It was built ontop of a hill by the Americans using picks and shovels. They have no running water, no electricity, and very little in the way of any sort of modern comforts. It's somewhat surprising to think that even today U.S. soldiers are living and fighting out of what are little more than tents and basically living on the bare ground. The position is fortified with the lowest of the low tech - bags of dirt - yet still manages to sport some impressive weaponry.
In fact the American's don't have much more than the local population, who live in stone houses dug mainly into the mountainsides and hills. The film follows the Americans as they go on frequent patrols and occasionally interrogate the local population, searching for Insurgents and contraband. This leads into the next theme...
Tensions: I got the impression that the "hearts and minds" campaign isn't going very well. The villagers seem to be respectful of the Americans, but you get the sense that this is motivated by fear, and that there is a deep distrust for the soldiers. The Americans may often show up abruptly at peoples homes, going door to door and looking for intelligence on the Taliban or a number of other things. I think most people have experience with salesmen or people looking for donations who go door to door, and how unpleasant is can be having strangers approach you wanting your time or money. It's hard to imagine though what that's like when these strangers come in groups of 10 or more, armed with automatic weapons. I can't blame the Afghans for disliking or even hating the Americans, and I'm sure the Americans don't enjoy having to do that kind of work either.
We get to sit in on several Shura with village elders and the American commanders. These meetings are apparently an attempt to get the locals involved in decision making, and to give them a sense of responsibility for their own futures. They don't appear to be very productive for the most part though. The Americans don't seem to take the Afghans very seriously and are not willing to compromise much, and the Afghans are not willing to forget the injustices and grievances they have. Perhaps its the start of progress, but I think at least in the Korangal American and Afghan relations have a long way to go.
Unseen Enemy: Throughout the film, despite the numerous firefights we never actually see the Taliban. I don't think this is intentional either, but rather speaks to the guerrilla nature of the war. The Taliban seem to employ "shoot and scoot" tactics, taking advantage of the rugged terrain to disappear after they've unleashed a volley of gunfire on the Americans below. They often shoot at the Americans from across the valley, which puts them at a great advantage - they always know where the Americans are, but the Americans never know where they are. The difficulties in fighting this kind of war, coupled with the difficulties of daily life, are made apparent in this film.
Cost of war: The movie is named after "Doc Restrepo" a soldier who was killed there during deployment. We also hear the names of other soldiers who were killed, and even are witness to a Sergent killed in a particularly hair-raising battle. It's not just the Americans who suffer losses though, we also see the devastating effect of an air strike on a home in a village. We see injured women and children standing around, terrified and helpless as the Americans go through the rubble looking for weapons. In one shot a man stands in silence holding a small injured child in his hands, and the hatred on his face for the Americans who are casually walking around him is obvious, and frankly I don't blame him. No one in that position would react in any other way than to hate the people who nearly killed your family. Both sides face losses, the Americans and the Taliban. but somehow I feel the villagers and the local people are the ones who really suffer.
Restrepo is great because it doesn't attempt to filter the war, put a slant on things, or send any type of message. It's simply an honest account, and the viewer is left to make up his own mind - even if that means making the Americans don't end up looking good. It's a welcome relief from some of the bullshit reporting that the major news networks show on T.V. and I think would be a big surprise to the average American. The themes that arise naturally in the film run deep throughout all of Afghanistan, and are at the heart of this ten year war that doesn't seem to have an end in sight.
Friday, February 25, 2011
Tuesday, February 22, 2011
Unrest in the Muslim World and American Foreign Policy
The recent uprisings in Tunisia seem to be the spark which has ignited a powder-keg in the Muslim world, to quote a phrase often used in the media. Though this subject may be somewhat off-topic, I feel that the timing warrants some discussion on how these events may impact Americas foreign policy in the region in the years to come.
Egypt is under full military control, and uprisings are spreading to Libya, Bahrain, and protests are breaking out in Yemen and even Iran. From the point of view of someone who isn't very knowledgeable of the political realities of these countries, or of the exact circumstances surrounding the events leading up to all these events, its hard to know if these mark the true beginnings of change in the region, or are merely a way for people to vent their anger and frustration, but will ultimately settle down. Even if the latter turns out to not be true, and we do see some form of "democracy" emerge - how true will it be to the wishes of the people?
Many of these Muslim countries have a history of coups, but most seemed to be caught in the same cycle of revolution, "regime change", brutality and corruption. As much as I would love to imagine that the Muslim people can finally liberate themselves and set up functional governments which truly represent the interests of the people - I think history has shown this is unlikely. What does this mean for American foreign policy in the region then?
It's no big secret that the U.S. has exerted influence over many countries through "backroom politics", meetings between heads of state where deals are negotiated. In exchange for U.S. foreign aid and other monetary supplements, these dictators or men of power agree to cooperate with the U.S. on whatever the issue at hand is, and because the U.S. is so rich, and many of these countries so poor, we are able to exert great influence in the world without necessarily having to impose our will by force. It's convenient for the U.S. to deal with dictators who are relatively easy to buy, and who we can build long relationships with. Unlike presidents who come and go, and who may have different political convictions, a dictator may remain in power for life, and so long as he stays on the C.I.A. payroll, may be content to cooperate with the U.S.
So if these men lose power, especially in countries the U.S. deems as "important" or "strategic" it may have major consequences for the future course of events. Mubarak, for instance, has been a close U.S. ally for years, and it will be interesting to see who, or what, takes his place. Regardless of how things turn out, I think this may mark an even further increasing involvement of the U.S. in the region. If a scramble for power occurs in Egypt, I think it's likely that whoever ends out ahead will be open to making deals and receiving aid from the U.S., and we will simply re-forge our alliance with the new guy. The same is likely to occur in these other countries, and in fact with new regimes and power holders popping up, it may be an opportunity for the U.S. to actually make even more "allies" in the region.
One thing to remember though, is that America isn't the only big kid on the block these days. These events may be a perfect opportunity for counties like China and India to gain influence in the region, which would certainly be in their oil-thirsty economies interests. I can imagine some sort of re-emerging "great game", but on a more diplomatic level, and this time between the U.S, India, China and the other powers of the world. Of course all of that depends on whether or not anything really comes of all this unrest.
Another scenario is that some of these uprisings may actually succeed in setting up a democracy, or even Islamic government - who may or may not be interested in dealing with the U.S. I think in the case of the former, modernization is a goal and that means talking to countries like the U.S. But what if Egypt and Tunisia and these other countries end up like Iran? I have no idea how unlikely that is (though I imagine fairly unlikely), but certainly it would have major political consequences. One thing is for certain though - most of the middle east does not like America. Emerging governments who are desperate to gain public support may not want to anger the people further by getting involved with America, and this again opens the doors to countries like China who may be seeking to build their presence in the region.
All in all, I feel these events are a sensitive issue, and may prove to be a significant turning point for the U.S. foreign affairs. In history there seems to be a common theme of long periods of stagnation, followed by explosive change which forever reshapes the future. It's probably to early to tell if we are at the beginnings of such change, and I don't yet feel informed enough to say either way, but more than ever I think the middle east is a place to keep a close eye on.
Egypt is under full military control, and uprisings are spreading to Libya, Bahrain, and protests are breaking out in Yemen and even Iran. From the point of view of someone who isn't very knowledgeable of the political realities of these countries, or of the exact circumstances surrounding the events leading up to all these events, its hard to know if these mark the true beginnings of change in the region, or are merely a way for people to vent their anger and frustration, but will ultimately settle down. Even if the latter turns out to not be true, and we do see some form of "democracy" emerge - how true will it be to the wishes of the people?
Many of these Muslim countries have a history of coups, but most seemed to be caught in the same cycle of revolution, "regime change", brutality and corruption. As much as I would love to imagine that the Muslim people can finally liberate themselves and set up functional governments which truly represent the interests of the people - I think history has shown this is unlikely. What does this mean for American foreign policy in the region then?
It's no big secret that the U.S. has exerted influence over many countries through "backroom politics", meetings between heads of state where deals are negotiated. In exchange for U.S. foreign aid and other monetary supplements, these dictators or men of power agree to cooperate with the U.S. on whatever the issue at hand is, and because the U.S. is so rich, and many of these countries so poor, we are able to exert great influence in the world without necessarily having to impose our will by force. It's convenient for the U.S. to deal with dictators who are relatively easy to buy, and who we can build long relationships with. Unlike presidents who come and go, and who may have different political convictions, a dictator may remain in power for life, and so long as he stays on the C.I.A. payroll, may be content to cooperate with the U.S.
So if these men lose power, especially in countries the U.S. deems as "important" or "strategic" it may have major consequences for the future course of events. Mubarak, for instance, has been a close U.S. ally for years, and it will be interesting to see who, or what, takes his place. Regardless of how things turn out, I think this may mark an even further increasing involvement of the U.S. in the region. If a scramble for power occurs in Egypt, I think it's likely that whoever ends out ahead will be open to making deals and receiving aid from the U.S., and we will simply re-forge our alliance with the new guy. The same is likely to occur in these other countries, and in fact with new regimes and power holders popping up, it may be an opportunity for the U.S. to actually make even more "allies" in the region.
One thing to remember though, is that America isn't the only big kid on the block these days. These events may be a perfect opportunity for counties like China and India to gain influence in the region, which would certainly be in their oil-thirsty economies interests. I can imagine some sort of re-emerging "great game", but on a more diplomatic level, and this time between the U.S, India, China and the other powers of the world. Of course all of that depends on whether or not anything really comes of all this unrest.
Another scenario is that some of these uprisings may actually succeed in setting up a democracy, or even Islamic government - who may or may not be interested in dealing with the U.S. I think in the case of the former, modernization is a goal and that means talking to countries like the U.S. But what if Egypt and Tunisia and these other countries end up like Iran? I have no idea how unlikely that is (though I imagine fairly unlikely), but certainly it would have major political consequences. One thing is for certain though - most of the middle east does not like America. Emerging governments who are desperate to gain public support may not want to anger the people further by getting involved with America, and this again opens the doors to countries like China who may be seeking to build their presence in the region.
All in all, I feel these events are a sensitive issue, and may prove to be a significant turning point for the U.S. foreign affairs. In history there seems to be a common theme of long periods of stagnation, followed by explosive change which forever reshapes the future. It's probably to early to tell if we are at the beginnings of such change, and I don't yet feel informed enough to say either way, but more than ever I think the middle east is a place to keep a close eye on.
Friday, February 18, 2011
Afghanistan and Oil
I remember when it was announced that we were invading Afghanistan on television. I was only 11 years old, and had never even heard of the country, but I remember it being a confusing time. I suppose when you're that young, the rest of the world doesn't really seem like a real place. I'd like to think that I've become a bit more aware since then, but only during the past few class discussions, coupled with what Mr. Butler had to say (who was also introduced in class) that have things really begun to make sense - at least on the part of the United States involvement in Afghanistan and the region.
Let me first preface by saying that I am not one to buy into conspiracy theories and extraordinary claims without evidence in proportion to the claim. As a physics student who is training to one day enter the scientific community, you are reminded frequently to be distrustful of peoples claims unless they are supported by compelling evidence. That is the guiding principle of science - theories and ideas must be supported by observable evidence (and in general solid mathematical footing, but that doesn't apply to the softer sciences in all cases). This principle has worked out pretty good so far. Human beings wallowed in ignorance of the working of the world for millenia until a few smart guys in Europe started a revolution in thought that would lead to men standing on the moon, instantaneous (in human terms) global communication, and eradication of diseases that once killed thousands, just to name a few of the triumphs of science.
So with that in mind, there's no reason to approach Social issues any differently. Although the complicated social fabric of human affairs can often be a tangled mess in which the "evidence" is in it's self questionable, I think the process of critical thought is equally as valid in examining American foreign policies as it is in deriving a mathematical law of nature. Thinking realistically and considering what Americas motivations were for invading Afghanistan, I'm lead to the same conclusion many others have put forward - that it's about oil.
Just think about what oil means to America. It fuels our cars, our power plants, our factories, it heats our homes, schools, and workplaces, we derived useful chemicals from it such as plastics which have become a huge industry in it's self, and possibly most importantly it fuels our military, and that means it fuels our foreign affairs. The fact is, oil is the number one national security issue. I really don't think it's possible to dispute that, we are utterly dependent upon the substance. And like a heroin addict, we will go to great lengths to ensure we can continue getting it. However, Afghanistan might seem like a strange place to be if we are interested in oil - after all there really isn't any oil there. Many of Afghanistan's neighbors, however, do have oil. Or, in the case of Tajikistan, natural gas, which has equally important applications in industry, industry that is exploding in places like China and India.
After my spiel about the great scientific method, it seems hypocritical the way I'm going about this short essay without citing some of these claims and providing sources, but then I'd be doing two research papers a week, and that isn't feasible. So I have to be fairly informal and I wouldn't expect anyone who read this (which in all likely hood will be two people, one of which is myself) to be convinced, rather I am only putting my thoughts into words here. That being said, according the the wikipedia article on the TAPI pipeline, the line would pump 27 billion cubic feet of natural gas per year. Lets just look at how much money that would be.
According the to DOE's monthly natural gas report , the current price of natural gas is about $12 per 1000 cubic feet.
So at a rate of 27 billion cubic feet per year, that equates to 27,000,000,000/1000 x $12.00 = $324,000,000 dollars a year, and that's only one pipeline. Now, clearly the government is not in Afghanistan for one pipeline, but I have come to believe that we are there to secure a pro-American government who can be a major player in the oil and natural gas market - especially those markets which will be focused on selling to India. When you consider the fact that the U.S. president at the time of the invasion, George Bush and his vice president Dick Cheney both worked in the oil business, this is not a stretch.
I think was our presence limited only to Afghanistan this argument about oil would be pretty weak - we did have some legitimate reasons for invading. The Taliban were and are a radical group who did sponsor Al-Qaeda which was responsible for attacks on the United States, and that we couldn't sit idly by about. However, I don't think that alone is justification for a full invasion either. Taking both of these two main factors together though, then it makes perfect sense to invade. The argument is made even stronger when one considers the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the disastrous circumstances involving that war.
I am giving certain people too much credit perhaps though. When all is said and done, people are simple, and people in power are motivated by simple things. National security, the good of the nation, these are all grand notions, but in my opinion, Afghanistan, and especially Iraq, were motivated by simple human greed. The opportunity presented its self to not only secure Americas interested in the region, but also the interests of individuals who sought to make a personal fortune. This type of thing is common throughout history, and dictators, kings and other men of power have often gone to war for personal gain. It may be hard believe that this is still going on, in America especially, but in the end why shouldn't it? Humans haven't changed, and greed is as powerful a motivator as ever. You'll notice that I haven't even entertained the idea that we invaded to somehow "liberate" these people.
For a long time I'd thought about the war, and it never made any sense to me. I think what class has done so far, and reading Rasanyagam too, is to begin to fill in those missing pieces for me. So in summary, I believe it is very likely that Afghanistan was motivated by legitimate reasons, but there was also a desire to establish a larger American presence in the region having to do with oil. I believe the invasion of Iraq offers strong support for the latter statement.Perhaps as I learn more my opinion my change, but all signs seems to be pointing in the direction of this conclusion.
Let me first preface by saying that I am not one to buy into conspiracy theories and extraordinary claims without evidence in proportion to the claim. As a physics student who is training to one day enter the scientific community, you are reminded frequently to be distrustful of peoples claims unless they are supported by compelling evidence. That is the guiding principle of science - theories and ideas must be supported by observable evidence (and in general solid mathematical footing, but that doesn't apply to the softer sciences in all cases). This principle has worked out pretty good so far. Human beings wallowed in ignorance of the working of the world for millenia until a few smart guys in Europe started a revolution in thought that would lead to men standing on the moon, instantaneous (in human terms) global communication, and eradication of diseases that once killed thousands, just to name a few of the triumphs of science.
So with that in mind, there's no reason to approach Social issues any differently. Although the complicated social fabric of human affairs can often be a tangled mess in which the "evidence" is in it's self questionable, I think the process of critical thought is equally as valid in examining American foreign policies as it is in deriving a mathematical law of nature. Thinking realistically and considering what Americas motivations were for invading Afghanistan, I'm lead to the same conclusion many others have put forward - that it's about oil.
Just think about what oil means to America. It fuels our cars, our power plants, our factories, it heats our homes, schools, and workplaces, we derived useful chemicals from it such as plastics which have become a huge industry in it's self, and possibly most importantly it fuels our military, and that means it fuels our foreign affairs. The fact is, oil is the number one national security issue. I really don't think it's possible to dispute that, we are utterly dependent upon the substance. And like a heroin addict, we will go to great lengths to ensure we can continue getting it. However, Afghanistan might seem like a strange place to be if we are interested in oil - after all there really isn't any oil there. Many of Afghanistan's neighbors, however, do have oil. Or, in the case of Tajikistan, natural gas, which has equally important applications in industry, industry that is exploding in places like China and India.
After my spiel about the great scientific method, it seems hypocritical the way I'm going about this short essay without citing some of these claims and providing sources, but then I'd be doing two research papers a week, and that isn't feasible. So I have to be fairly informal and I wouldn't expect anyone who read this (which in all likely hood will be two people, one of which is myself) to be convinced, rather I am only putting my thoughts into words here. That being said, according the the wikipedia article on the TAPI pipeline, the line would pump 27 billion cubic feet of natural gas per year. Lets just look at how much money that would be.
According the to DOE's monthly natural gas report , the current price of natural gas is about $12 per 1000 cubic feet.
So at a rate of 27 billion cubic feet per year, that equates to 27,000,000,000/1000 x $12.00 = $324,000,000 dollars a year, and that's only one pipeline. Now, clearly the government is not in Afghanistan for one pipeline, but I have come to believe that we are there to secure a pro-American government who can be a major player in the oil and natural gas market - especially those markets which will be focused on selling to India. When you consider the fact that the U.S. president at the time of the invasion, George Bush and his vice president Dick Cheney both worked in the oil business, this is not a stretch.
I think was our presence limited only to Afghanistan this argument about oil would be pretty weak - we did have some legitimate reasons for invading. The Taliban were and are a radical group who did sponsor Al-Qaeda which was responsible for attacks on the United States, and that we couldn't sit idly by about. However, I don't think that alone is justification for a full invasion either. Taking both of these two main factors together though, then it makes perfect sense to invade. The argument is made even stronger when one considers the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the disastrous circumstances involving that war.
I am giving certain people too much credit perhaps though. When all is said and done, people are simple, and people in power are motivated by simple things. National security, the good of the nation, these are all grand notions, but in my opinion, Afghanistan, and especially Iraq, were motivated by simple human greed. The opportunity presented its self to not only secure Americas interested in the region, but also the interests of individuals who sought to make a personal fortune. This type of thing is common throughout history, and dictators, kings and other men of power have often gone to war for personal gain. It may be hard believe that this is still going on, in America especially, but in the end why shouldn't it? Humans haven't changed, and greed is as powerful a motivator as ever. You'll notice that I haven't even entertained the idea that we invaded to somehow "liberate" these people.
For a long time I'd thought about the war, and it never made any sense to me. I think what class has done so far, and reading Rasanyagam too, is to begin to fill in those missing pieces for me. So in summary, I believe it is very likely that Afghanistan was motivated by legitimate reasons, but there was also a desire to establish a larger American presence in the region having to do with oil. I believe the invasion of Iraq offers strong support for the latter statement.Perhaps as I learn more my opinion my change, but all signs seems to be pointing in the direction of this conclusion.
Tuesday, February 15, 2011
"Hearts and Minds"
The discussion in class today got me thinking about the situation in Afghanistan and the current U.S. strategy there. It's apparent that our main goal today is to set up a pro-American government which can bring stability to and excise it's authority over Afghanistan. The first part has already been accomplished - even if Karzai occasionally spouts some rhetoric bordering on anti-American, it's nothing more then rhetoric. I think it's obvious that the Afghanistan government is in no position to go against any wishes of the United States.
It is the second part that remains to be the biggest challenge. Fundamentally I think there are two ways in which a government maintains its power. Either through popular consensus, or through force. Even a government which is considered "unpopular" may still retain its power if people are content enough not to risk their lives going up against it. When they are though, the only way to maintain rule is through force. Of these two, I think the Soviet experience in Afghanistan has proven that the latter simply doesn't work. It's somewhat amazing how strong of a will these desert dwelling people possess. The more force you apply, the more resistance you will face. Even the might of the U.S. military has not been able to stamp out resistance in the region, and that's saying a lot.
The other option, which most people would agree is by far the preferable, is to somehow instill support for the government in the Afghan people. I think this is what the U.S. strategy aims to do, but honestly I don't know how it could ever work. Afghanistan is a deeply divided society, on many different fronts. When the military speaks of "hearts and minds" I don't think they are referring to the city dwelling populations. The term modern doesn't really apply very well in Afghanistan, but places like Kabul are about as modern as you can get there, and modern people are fairly easy to please. Education, jobs and the the prospect of economic advancement is all most urban folk really want (though those goals are not always easy to achieve). That and the basics like freedom from oppression and the standard package of human rights - but this is America we're talking about. The hearts and minds of the rural folk though, are the ones I think this strategy is really calling for, and therein lies the problem.
The issues involve are so complex and I don't pretend to be able to offer any kind of thorough analysis on this, but I do think I can recognize some of the key issues and difficulties involved in the situation. When one aims to win the "heart and mind" of a Afghan, a very fundamental problem arises - there really is no such thing as an Afghan.
The lack of any sort of national identity in Afghanistan is a problem when trying to get people to accept the authority of a centralized government. To a rural Pashtun, his identity is his qawm - his village and local community, his family and the places he has grown and lived all his life, his religious leaders and tribe. And with that goes a set of values very distinct from our own. To people like this, the centralized government in Kabul is as foreign as the United States or Soviet Russia. Why should a Pashtun who is living as people have for thousands of years want to pay taxes to or submit to the authority of what he sees a western controlled government who is opposed to all the values he holds dear and which define who he is? What can the government in Kabul offer the average Afghan who is content to live his life and is unconcerned with the rest of the world and things like modernization - and is in fact threatened by it?
Further making our position weaker there is the attempt to impose western values on the Afghans. Freedom of religion, equal rights for women, and the various other changes the new government is trying to impose are all great things - but not necessarily if they are contributing to the instability of the region and prolong bloodshed. In my poorly informed opinion, I feel like the only way for winning "hearts and minds" is to simply let the rural people be as they are, and in time perhaps changes will come. Of course I'm being overly simplistic and there are much larger issues involved - like how to run a government if you don't tax the rural populations, but I can't imagine that trying to force certain changes on these people will ever work. Ultimately I think the situation is going to call for a lot of compromises. We just simply can not have our cake in Afghanistan and expect to eat it too. I think some compromise has already begun on the part of the Afghan government through the re-assimilation of militants who surrender to the government, and possible talks of negotiation with the Taliban. I wonder though how far the American military is willing to compromise, and if it will even do any good at this point...
It is the second part that remains to be the biggest challenge. Fundamentally I think there are two ways in which a government maintains its power. Either through popular consensus, or through force. Even a government which is considered "unpopular" may still retain its power if people are content enough not to risk their lives going up against it. When they are though, the only way to maintain rule is through force. Of these two, I think the Soviet experience in Afghanistan has proven that the latter simply doesn't work. It's somewhat amazing how strong of a will these desert dwelling people possess. The more force you apply, the more resistance you will face. Even the might of the U.S. military has not been able to stamp out resistance in the region, and that's saying a lot.
The other option, which most people would agree is by far the preferable, is to somehow instill support for the government in the Afghan people. I think this is what the U.S. strategy aims to do, but honestly I don't know how it could ever work. Afghanistan is a deeply divided society, on many different fronts. When the military speaks of "hearts and minds" I don't think they are referring to the city dwelling populations. The term modern doesn't really apply very well in Afghanistan, but places like Kabul are about as modern as you can get there, and modern people are fairly easy to please. Education, jobs and the the prospect of economic advancement is all most urban folk really want (though those goals are not always easy to achieve). That and the basics like freedom from oppression and the standard package of human rights - but this is America we're talking about. The hearts and minds of the rural folk though, are the ones I think this strategy is really calling for, and therein lies the problem.
The issues involve are so complex and I don't pretend to be able to offer any kind of thorough analysis on this, but I do think I can recognize some of the key issues and difficulties involved in the situation. When one aims to win the "heart and mind" of a Afghan, a very fundamental problem arises - there really is no such thing as an Afghan.
The lack of any sort of national identity in Afghanistan is a problem when trying to get people to accept the authority of a centralized government. To a rural Pashtun, his identity is his qawm - his village and local community, his family and the places he has grown and lived all his life, his religious leaders and tribe. And with that goes a set of values very distinct from our own. To people like this, the centralized government in Kabul is as foreign as the United States or Soviet Russia. Why should a Pashtun who is living as people have for thousands of years want to pay taxes to or submit to the authority of what he sees a western controlled government who is opposed to all the values he holds dear and which define who he is? What can the government in Kabul offer the average Afghan who is content to live his life and is unconcerned with the rest of the world and things like modernization - and is in fact threatened by it?
Further making our position weaker there is the attempt to impose western values on the Afghans. Freedom of religion, equal rights for women, and the various other changes the new government is trying to impose are all great things - but not necessarily if they are contributing to the instability of the region and prolong bloodshed. In my poorly informed opinion, I feel like the only way for winning "hearts and minds" is to simply let the rural people be as they are, and in time perhaps changes will come. Of course I'm being overly simplistic and there are much larger issues involved - like how to run a government if you don't tax the rural populations, but I can't imagine that trying to force certain changes on these people will ever work. Ultimately I think the situation is going to call for a lot of compromises. We just simply can not have our cake in Afghanistan and expect to eat it too. I think some compromise has already begun on the part of the Afghan government through the re-assimilation of militants who surrender to the government, and possible talks of negotiation with the Taliban. I wonder though how far the American military is willing to compromise, and if it will even do any good at this point...
Friday, February 11, 2011
The various peoples of Afghanistan pt. 2
Part two of attempting to sort out the dizzying collection of cultures found in Afghanistan.
Uzbeks: Afghanistan shares part of its northern border with Uzbekistan, "Land of the Uzbeks", so it's no surprise that most of the Uzbek population is found in northern Afghanistan. Uzbeks are often bilingual, speaking Persian as many other groups do, but also their own language called Uzbek.
They are a Turkic people who likely resulted from the conquests that took place in Central Asia by the Mongols. During this time, much of the local population was replaced or assimilated into Turkic groups who had begun migrating into the area. This mixing of peoples eventually lead to what are now called Uzbeks. Like most others in the region, they are Sunni Muslims. Historically they have been farmers and herders, known for raising an excellent type of Turkman horse.
Aimaks: Aimaks (or Aimaqs) are not an actual ethnic group. Aimak refers to a collection of nomadic tribes located in central and western Afghanistan. In fact the word "aimaq" means tribe in Turkish. They were originally known as "The four Eimaks" because there were four major tribes, and are Sunni muslims. They speak Persian and are of Iranian blood. They are known as a "bold and wild people".
Turkmen: Turkmen are a minority in Afghanistan that hug the border to Turkmenistan in the north west. They are traditionally a nomadic people who survive by farming, animal husbandry and the manufacture of carpets. They share many similarities with the Uzbeks, including a belief in Sunni Islam, and a bilingual language. Many speak the local dialects of Persian, but they have their own language known as Turkman.
Balochs: The Baloch or Baluch are a small minority located in the deserts of southern Afghanistan. They speak their own language called Balochi are are Sunni Muslims. They are descended from ancient Median and Persian tribes, and maintain a distinct cultural identity. Much of their culture and traditions can be traced all the way back to Mesopotamia. Their customs and traditions are conducted according to rigid codes and tribal law. South of the border lies the Pakistan province of Baluchistan, where the majority of Balochs live today.
These are just some of the people who inhabit Afghanistan and which I've chosen for this little piece.There are still dozens of other small minorities sprinkled throughout Afghanistan. One thing I have learned so far from this class is that Afghanistan is a complicated place - far more so than I realized before. Although, it's really not all that different from a place like America. To an ignorant outside observer like myself, it appears to be a cacophony of unfamiliar names and peoples, but no more so than places like Eastern or even Western Europe. Like American, Afghanistan is a melting pot of a broad range of cultures, many of which are quite distinct, though to ignorant Americans they may all look the same at first glance.
I hope by the end of the course I have a better understanding of who all these people are, but writing these two posts I think has given me a nice head start.
References:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demography_of_Afghanistan
http://www.1911encyclopedia.org/Aimak
http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCs/Ghor/Ghor.html
An Uzbek Man |
They are a Turkic people who likely resulted from the conquests that took place in Central Asia by the Mongols. During this time, much of the local population was replaced or assimilated into Turkic groups who had begun migrating into the area. This mixing of peoples eventually lead to what are now called Uzbeks. Like most others in the region, they are Sunni Muslims. Historically they have been farmers and herders, known for raising an excellent type of Turkman horse.
Aimaks: Aimaks (or Aimaqs) are not an actual ethnic group. Aimak refers to a collection of nomadic tribes located in central and western Afghanistan. In fact the word "aimaq" means tribe in Turkish. They were originally known as "The four Eimaks" because there were four major tribes, and are Sunni muslims. They speak Persian and are of Iranian blood. They are known as a "bold and wild people".
Turkmen: Turkmen are a minority in Afghanistan that hug the border to Turkmenistan in the north west. They are traditionally a nomadic people who survive by farming, animal husbandry and the manufacture of carpets. They share many similarities with the Uzbeks, including a belief in Sunni Islam, and a bilingual language. Many speak the local dialects of Persian, but they have their own language known as Turkman.
Two Baloch women |
These are just some of the people who inhabit Afghanistan and which I've chosen for this little piece.There are still dozens of other small minorities sprinkled throughout Afghanistan. One thing I have learned so far from this class is that Afghanistan is a complicated place - far more so than I realized before. Although, it's really not all that different from a place like America. To an ignorant outside observer like myself, it appears to be a cacophony of unfamiliar names and peoples, but no more so than places like Eastern or even Western Europe. Like American, Afghanistan is a melting pot of a broad range of cultures, many of which are quite distinct, though to ignorant Americans they may all look the same at first glance.
I hope by the end of the course I have a better understanding of who all these people are, but writing these two posts I think has given me a nice head start.
References:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demography_of_Afghanistan
http://www.1911encyclopedia.org/Aimak
http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCs/Ghor/Ghor.html
Tuesday, February 8, 2011
The various peoples of Afghanistan
Afghanistan, like America, is made up of people of many different ethnic backgrounds. Reading Rasanayagam, it can be a little dizzying when different ethnicities are mentioned without having any understanding about what separates them. It's a bit like talking about different periods of European history without knowing who the French and English are.
So to educate myself a little bit, I thought I'd write a short blurb about the different groups who make up the majority of the population in Afghanistan. By no means do I intend to attempt to write a detailed account of each groups history - that could be a whole research paper in it's self. Just enough to highlight the differences between the groups and be able to get and understanding of how Afghan society is differentiated. According to the world factbook, Afghanistan is made up of roughly 70% Pashtuns and Tajik, with another 9% Hazara, 9% Uzbek, 4% Aimak and a variety of other minorities.
Pashtuns: Pashtuns are an eastern Iranian group who make up the majority of the population of Afghanistan. They have played a dominant role in Afghanistan's history and in modern Afghan society. They are Sunni (as is most of Afghanistan), speak the Pashto language and follow what is known as Pashtunwali.
Pashtunwali is similar to, but distinct from, Sharia. It is a set of guiding moral principles, traditions and rules by which the Pashtuns live. Some of the principles include:
Melmastia (hospitality) - Pashtuns believe in showing hospitality and respect to all visitors of their home.
Sabat (loyalty) - Loyalty to one's family, tribe and friends.
Ghayrat (self honour) - Maintaining ones honor, which also implies one must respect the honor of others.
And there are several others as well. The exact origins of the Pashtun people are not well known, and they have no written history. They are located primarily in eastern, southern and southwestern Afghanistan (as well as Iran and Pakistan), and large concentrations can be found in the major cities. They have traditionally been a tribal society, with tribes broken down into clans and families, though Pashtuns living in urban cities may be disconnected from their tribal background. The Taliban is mostly made up of Pashtuns, as are many other militant groups.
Tajiks: The Tajiks are descended from Persia (modern day Iran) and speak modern Persian, known as Farsi. They make up the second largest group in Afghanistan, accounting for about 27% of the population. Though not as numerous, they make up a large portion of Afghanistans educated and elite, and as such have considerable influence in Afghan government and politics. They are sedentary traders, artisans and farmers and are Sunni Muslims.
Unlike the Pashtuns, they do not have a well defined social structure and often adopt that of their neighbors. They do, however, have their own set of beliefs and traditions. Because they are not organized into large tribes, Tajiks are very village oriented and have a strong sense of community loyalty. They live Primarily in the North East near the border to Tajikastan and down to Kabul, and there is also a concentration of Tajiks surrounding Herat.
Hazara: Hazarans occupy much of the mountainous and rugged central Afghanistan known as Hazarajat.Unlike most other Afghan groups, they are predominantly Shia Muslims, which as times has brought persecution upon them. Hazarans are thought to descend from the mongols - if not directly from Genghis Khan - and have facial features distinct from other groups in Afghanistan. They speak Hazaragi, a dialect of the Farsi language.
The American invasion of Afghanistan has greatly liberated the Hazara people. Under the Taliban they were heavily persecuted - mainly due to their Shia believes, and had very little socioeconomic status. In the past ten years, there is much more opportunity for the Hazran man and woman.
Continued in Friday's post...
Some references:
http://countrystudies.us/afghanistan/40.htm
http://www.everyculture.com/wc/Tajikistan-to-Zimbabwe/Tajiks.html
http://www.everyculture.com/wc/Afghanistan-to-Bosnia-Herzegovina/Pashtun.html
http://www.afghan-network.net/Ethnic-Groups/tajiks.html
So to educate myself a little bit, I thought I'd write a short blurb about the different groups who make up the majority of the population in Afghanistan. By no means do I intend to attempt to write a detailed account of each groups history - that could be a whole research paper in it's self. Just enough to highlight the differences between the groups and be able to get and understanding of how Afghan society is differentiated. According to the world factbook, Afghanistan is made up of roughly 70% Pashtuns and Tajik, with another 9% Hazara, 9% Uzbek, 4% Aimak and a variety of other minorities.
Pashtuns: Pashtuns are an eastern Iranian group who make up the majority of the population of Afghanistan. They have played a dominant role in Afghanistan's history and in modern Afghan society. They are Sunni (as is most of Afghanistan), speak the Pashto language and follow what is known as Pashtunwali.
Hamid Karzai - Pashtun |
Pashtunwali is similar to, but distinct from, Sharia. It is a set of guiding moral principles, traditions and rules by which the Pashtuns live. Some of the principles include:
Melmastia (hospitality) - Pashtuns believe in showing hospitality and respect to all visitors of their home.
Sabat (loyalty) - Loyalty to one's family, tribe and friends.
Ghayrat (self honour) - Maintaining ones honor, which also implies one must respect the honor of others.
And there are several others as well. The exact origins of the Pashtun people are not well known, and they have no written history. They are located primarily in eastern, southern and southwestern Afghanistan (as well as Iran and Pakistan), and large concentrations can be found in the major cities. They have traditionally been a tribal society, with tribes broken down into clans and families, though Pashtuns living in urban cities may be disconnected from their tribal background. The Taliban is mostly made up of Pashtuns, as are many other militant groups.
Tajiks: The Tajiks are descended from Persia (modern day Iran) and speak modern Persian, known as Farsi. They make up the second largest group in Afghanistan, accounting for about 27% of the population. Though not as numerous, they make up a large portion of Afghanistans educated and elite, and as such have considerable influence in Afghan government and politics. They are sedentary traders, artisans and farmers and are Sunni Muslims.
Ahmad Shah Massoud - A Tajik |
Unlike the Pashtuns, they do not have a well defined social structure and often adopt that of their neighbors. They do, however, have their own set of beliefs and traditions. Because they are not organized into large tribes, Tajiks are very village oriented and have a strong sense of community loyalty. They live Primarily in the North East near the border to Tajikastan and down to Kabul, and there is also a concentration of Tajiks surrounding Herat.
Hazara: Hazarans occupy much of the mountainous and rugged central Afghanistan known as Hazarajat.Unlike most other Afghan groups, they are predominantly Shia Muslims, which as times has brought persecution upon them. Hazarans are thought to descend from the mongols - if not directly from Genghis Khan - and have facial features distinct from other groups in Afghanistan. They speak Hazaragi, a dialect of the Farsi language.
A Hazaran girl |
The American invasion of Afghanistan has greatly liberated the Hazara people. Under the Taliban they were heavily persecuted - mainly due to their Shia believes, and had very little socioeconomic status. In the past ten years, there is much more opportunity for the Hazran man and woman.
Continued in Friday's post...
Some references:
http://countrystudies.us/afghanistan/40.htm
http://www.everyculture.com/wc/Tajikistan-to-Zimbabwe/Tajiks.html
http://www.everyculture.com/wc/Afghanistan-to-Bosnia-Herzegovina/Pashtun.html
http://www.afghan-network.net/Ethnic-Groups/tajiks.html
Friday, February 4, 2011
Hafizullah Amin was a Bad and Stupid Man
I find the Soviet entanglement in Afghanistan's history to be really interesting. As I read Rasanayagams outline of the events leading to the Soviet invasion, one character stands out to me - Hafizullah Amin. I'm not sure what kind of man he was in his personal life, but as a leader he was certainly cruel and in my opinion made some painfully stupid mistakes.
It seemed from the start Amin's intentions were only to eventually wrestle control over the country and set up some sort of dictatorship for himself (which he eventually did). I don't think Amin had the foresight to attempt to legitimize his power in anyway. As a leader in the PDPA and a participant in the coup, it was only natural that he would play an important role in the government - despite how dysfunctional or corrupt it may have been. However, as a murderous and scheming tyrant what possible reason would people have to accept his authority - if not for fear of their lives.
Even before these events though, Amin and many others in power seemed ignorant of the needs and realities in the lives of the rural people in their own country. Perhaps this is a testament to the schism that exists in Afghan society between the rural areas and the large cities, but I feel as Afghans the PDPA and Amin himself should have realized that forcing harsh reforms on a people rooted in centuries of tradition and set in very stern ways would only be a recipe for disaster. I had never realized how bloody Afghanistan's history was. A figure quoted by Rasanaygam estimated that as many as 100,000 people may have been executed by Amin and Taraki, with more to be followed once Amin was to take power. Perhaps you can get away with mass murder if you are Joseph Stalin and are head of the USSR, but if you are head of a state which is dependent on foreign aid for survival and a largely dysfunctional government it doesn't make much sense to me. It seemed Amin did little but accumulated enemies and public anger during his time in government.
Finally, the dumbest move of them all, was Amin attempt to negotiate with the United States. For years Afghanistan received huge amounts of aid from the Soviet Union, it must have occurred to Amin that the Soviets had important interests in the region - interests which would be threatened by Western advances. I think it's pretty remarkable that Amin did not foresee that breaking ties to the Soviet Union and attempting to form relations with the United States would provoke a Soviet invasion. Perhaps he misjudged and thought America would be much more eager to become Afghanistan's new friend, which may have caused hesitation by the Soviet Union. I'm not sure that's likely though, seeing as he knew there were Soviet forces stationed on the border and some already in the country at the time.
Whatever Amin was thinking, this decision eventually lead to his death and a quagmire lasting nine years the conclusion of which inevitably (and somewhat ironically) has led to our own War in Afghanistan. It's unfortunate that one man's stupidity and brutality has caused (or at least exacerbated) so much fighting and suffering of the Afghan people.
It seemed from the start Amin's intentions were only to eventually wrestle control over the country and set up some sort of dictatorship for himself (which he eventually did). I don't think Amin had the foresight to attempt to legitimize his power in anyway. As a leader in the PDPA and a participant in the coup, it was only natural that he would play an important role in the government - despite how dysfunctional or corrupt it may have been. However, as a murderous and scheming tyrant what possible reason would people have to accept his authority - if not for fear of their lives.
Even before these events though, Amin and many others in power seemed ignorant of the needs and realities in the lives of the rural people in their own country. Perhaps this is a testament to the schism that exists in Afghan society between the rural areas and the large cities, but I feel as Afghans the PDPA and Amin himself should have realized that forcing harsh reforms on a people rooted in centuries of tradition and set in very stern ways would only be a recipe for disaster. I had never realized how bloody Afghanistan's history was. A figure quoted by Rasanaygam estimated that as many as 100,000 people may have been executed by Amin and Taraki, with more to be followed once Amin was to take power. Perhaps you can get away with mass murder if you are Joseph Stalin and are head of the USSR, but if you are head of a state which is dependent on foreign aid for survival and a largely dysfunctional government it doesn't make much sense to me. It seemed Amin did little but accumulated enemies and public anger during his time in government.
Finally, the dumbest move of them all, was Amin attempt to negotiate with the United States. For years Afghanistan received huge amounts of aid from the Soviet Union, it must have occurred to Amin that the Soviets had important interests in the region - interests which would be threatened by Western advances. I think it's pretty remarkable that Amin did not foresee that breaking ties to the Soviet Union and attempting to form relations with the United States would provoke a Soviet invasion. Perhaps he misjudged and thought America would be much more eager to become Afghanistan's new friend, which may have caused hesitation by the Soviet Union. I'm not sure that's likely though, seeing as he knew there were Soviet forces stationed on the border and some already in the country at the time.
Whatever Amin was thinking, this decision eventually lead to his death and a quagmire lasting nine years the conclusion of which inevitably (and somewhat ironically) has led to our own War in Afghanistan. It's unfortunate that one man's stupidity and brutality has caused (or at least exacerbated) so much fighting and suffering of the Afghan people.
Tuesday, February 1, 2011
The Taliban in Pakistan
VBS.tv is an online television network owned by the Vice media conglomerate. The network produces original, short-form, documentary-style video content. Subject matter includes humanitarian issues, music, insider travel guides, and news.- Wikipedia entry on VBS.tv
VBS isn't a website I normally frequent, but they do occasionally host short documentaries shot in various troubled regions of the world, from North Korea to Liberia. These documentaries often focus on the region's troubles from the perspective of average people on the street and are told mainly through interviews and brief narration.
Recently, Vice did one titled "The Taliban in Pakistan" which really impressed me.
Suroosh Alvi (an Indian Canadian journalist and co-founder of Vice) took a trip to Peshawar to talk with people living and working there and in the surrounding regions. I'll leave the details for the video to show, but I will comment on my reaction and some of the things that stood out to me.
Right from the start we are reminded of the grim reality faced by people working and living in the area. Scenes of people injured in a suicide bombing, barricades and armed guards set up at the hotel the host is staying at and aerial shots of the sprawling desert city set the stage.
While talking with a member of the Pakistani Police force, one of the Police officers claims really struck me. He remarked that "The Taliban have better equipment than we do. We can't match what they have. We are here waiting and dying for the country on minimum wage. It would be nice if the government helped us." To me that is absolutely mind blowing in several ways. I think the immediate reaction is to ask why the Pakistani government is not supporting these people with better supplies and military assistance. Generally I think the purpose of the Police is to deal with civilian and local issues - not to battle insurgents. So I am not sure if these policemen are also part of the military, or are simply filly in a void, but the situation seems totally backwards. The second question that leaps to mind is, what is motivating these Policemen to put themselves in these positions? To put your life at major risk fighting with poor supplies for a seemingly unsupportive government and at minimum wage, which for a Pakistani must be terribly little... I just can't imagine people would be willing to do this kind of work, and yet people are. It really says a lot about the bravery these men posses.
One of the most telling parts of the documentary was when Alvi was speaking with Iqbal Khattak, bureau chief of the Peshawar newspaper "Daily Times", about the use of the U.S. predator drones. He recalled an interview he had had with former Taliban commander Baitullah Meshud in which Meshud had this to say about the drone attacks:
"If I campaign for three months to win the hearts and minds of the local population I may get some fifty or sixty people over to my side. But a single drone attack brings the whole village to my side."I think this quote summarizes one of the fundamental issue America is facing in this "War on Terrorism" beautifully.
Some of the more disturbing scenes in the documentary are videos glorifying young suicide bombers shot by the insurgents, one in particular shows a young man smiling and waving as he gets into a large truck, and the scene then cuts to a far away shot of the truck driving up to a security checkpoint and seconds later an enormous explosion occurs. These clips put a human face behind the black ski masks, and it is sobering.
Though this documentary wasn't directly about Afghanistan, I certainly feel like it leaves the viewer with real perspective on some of the realities and issues which are facing the region and the way in which it was shot offers us a view which most of us never get to see.
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